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Abstract 
We analyze the recruitment strategies and the survival of newly created establishments that are affiliated with pre-
established _rms. For the new establishments, the existence of ports of entry as well as the importance of internal 
and external recruitment is assessed. Being affiliated with a pre-established firm may be a source of competitive 
advantage and improve the new plant’s chances of survival as the parent firm may supply the newly created unit 
with expertise and firm-specific knowledge. In this research we suggest a channel for knowledge transfer that has 
been little addressed in previous literature: within firm and across establishments mobility of workers. As firm-specific 
knowledge is mainly embodied and non-tradable, we suggest that it can be successfully transferred to the new unit 
embodied in the workers that are internally recruited. We find that internally transferred workers, particularly skilled 
workers hired at high-rank jobs play an important role in improving the survival of new establishments.
Keywords: Worker’s mobility, Knowledge transfer, New establishment’s survival
JEL Codes: J61, J62, L25
© The Author(s) 2020. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and 
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material 
in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material 
is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco 
mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/.
1 Introduction
The determinants of new plants survival has been the 
subject of extensive previous research. The present work 
builds upon an important piece of this literature that 
examines the survival and hazard rates of new plants that 
are affiliated with pre-established firms. While some pre-
vious research takes for granted that the affiliation to an 
existing firm brings increased and easier access to knowl-
edge, in this paper we extend the study of the channels by 
which the parent firm (or other units in the same group) 
can transfer knowledge to the newly opened branch. Our 
research contributes to the literature by focusing on a 
specific mechanism of within-firm transfer of knowledge 
that has been relatively neglected so far—the transfer of 
workers from pre-existing to newly-created establish-
ments of the same firm. The novelty in our work lies in 
the use of a large matched employer-employee data set 
to focus on the role that intra-firm mobility plays as a 
channel for transferring knowledge and expertise to 
the new unit and to analyze the impact of this internal 
recruitment strategy in the new unit’s survival. These 
internal movements not only strengthen personal ties 
between different plants but they are also a direct channel 
for knowledge transfer that has been scarcely addressed 
in previous literature.
The objectives of this paper are twofold. Our first 
objective is to characterize the recruitment policy of new 
establishments affiliated with multi-establishment firms, 
analyzing the importance of internal and external hires 
at different hierarchical levels. Our hypothesis is that, in 
the new unit, internal transfers will increase for higher 
hierarchical levels (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Lazear 
and Oyer 2004). The second objective of this paper is to 
asses if internal hires, specially at higher hierarchical lev-
els, affect the survival of new establishments. This is an 
indirect way to test if intra-firm mobility is motivated 
by the need to transfer firm-specific knowledge to the 
new unit. Our main hypothesis is that the share of inter-
nal hires positively affects survival because it works as a 
channel for knowledge transfer. We believe this channel 
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can work in two ways: first, a higher proportion of inter-
nally hired employees can increase personal contacts and 
acquaintances between the new plant and the other units 
of the group improving and smoothing communication. 
Second, a higher proportion of internal hiring will be 
particularly important in top-level jobs, where strategic 
decision-making occurs. As firm-specific human capi-
tal is embodied in the workers, it may be supplied to the 
new unit by internally transferring workers. Implement-
ing other effective strategies to transfer knowledge to the 
new unit may be particularly challenging for tacit knowl-
edge that is hard to codify.
Our findings show that external hires seem to prevail 
for occupations that are closer to the bottom of the hier-
archy, which sustains the existence of ports of entry, while 
internal hires prevail at the top. We also conclude that 
the share of internal hires, particularly for higher-rank 
jobs, has a positive impact on survival and that internal 
transfers are likely to be one important channel to trans-
fer firm-specific knowledge to new establishments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2 
we present relevant previous research; in Sect. 3 we detail 
our sample design and characterize the data; Sect.  4 
discusses the empirical strategy and presents the main 
results and Sect. 5 concludes.
2  Previous research
It has been found that the factors affecting the survival 
of new entrants are different depending on wether the 
entry is attempted by a new or by an already estab-
lished firm (Dunne et  al. 1988,  1989; Audretsch and 
Mahmood 1994; Mata et al. 1995; Mitchell 1994). Being 
owned by a pre-established firm may provide the new 
plant several types of advantages. These entrants may 
have better access to resources and financial markets, 
since they are affiliated with a pre-existing firm that has 
built a reputation (Brito and Mello 1995), and being 
affiliated to a group can also be an important source of 
economies of scale (Ingram 1996). The parent firm may 
also supply expertise in management and operational 
knowledge which can help the new plant in the devel-
opment of a successful entry strategy that will positively 
affect the new unit’s survival. As successful firms are 
those that develop firm-specific assets that cannot be 
imitated by competitors, this puts the ultimate source 
of competitive advantage of a firm in its workers (Darr 
et al. 1995; Youndt et al. 1996; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 
1991; Teece 1998). Analyzing the importance of knowl-
edge transfer, Ingram and Baum (1997) evaluated the 
importance of chain affiliation in the Manhattan hotel 
industry, while Darr et al. (1995) studied organizational 
learning and the transfer of knowledge among pizza 
stores, and Greve (1996) examined radio broadcasters 
which shared a common corporate owner. These stud-
ies emphasize the importance of knowledge transfer 
within organizations and conclude that being part of a 
chain of firms may improve the chances of survival of 
individual businesses.
Identifying the channels by which the transfer of 
knowledge occurs is also a central issue and different 
channels have been proposed in the literature. Some 
argue that this transfer results from regular communi-
cation that can facilitate the diffusion of innovation and 
the transfer of technology (Tushman 1977; Ghoshal and 
Bartlett 1988; Rothwell 1978), while others emphasize 
the importance of personal acquaintances and personal 
ties in the transfer of learning (Huberman 1983; Martilla 
1971; Liebenz 1982; Tushman 1977). Dutton and Star-
buck (1978) discuss the importance of regular meetings 
as a channel to transfer learning since more opportuni-
ties for communication and competence sharing among 
corporate units would result in self-imitation within 
the corporation (Greve 1996) and learning would occur 
in the form of intraorganizational mirroring behavior 
(Ingram and Baum 1997).
We build upon this literature by focusing on a specific 
mechanism of within-firm transfer of knowledge that 
has been scarcely addressed in previous literature—the 
transfer of workers from pre-existing to newly-created 
establishments of the same firm. As tacit knowledge and 
firm-specific human capital is mainly embodied in the 
workers and incorporated in the organization’s routines 
and processes (Nelson and Winter 1982; Coff 1997; Teece 
1998), analyzing intra-firm transfers is one way to asses 
the importance of knowledge transfer to the new unit’s 
survival.
Intra-firm mobility is also an essential question in per-
sonnel economics. When a pre-established firm consid-
ers the decision to open a new establishment, it has to 
make choices on how to fill the vacancies created in the 
new plant. The firm has two options: hire in the external 
labor market or fill the vacancy through internal realloca-
tion, transferring an employee from another unit within 
the same organization. Internal hires are a central chan-
nel to transfer and retain firm-specific human capital in 
internal labor markets (ILM) (Doeringer and Piore 1971). 
In essence, the decision on how to fill the vacancies in 
the newly created establishment is akin to the internal 
transfers decision which is central to the ILM literature. 
Although ILM literature typically focuses on single-
establishment firms (Baker et al. 1994a, b), in multi-plant 
firms, the existence of an internal labor market will not 
be restricted to one particular establishment but will 
comprise the whole firm, necessarily including all the 
units affiliated with the same parent firm. The hypothesis 
that, in multi-establishment firms, internal labor markets 
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comprise the firm as a whole, including all its units, is 
discussed in Tavares et al. (2018)
As mentioned previously, intra-firm mobility is a nat-
ural response to the existence of specific human capital 
(Becker 1962).1 A well known paper from Gibbons and 
Waldman (1999) develops on the role of learning and 
human capital acquisition as possible explanations for 
the observed career paths inside the organization. Once 
a worker acquires firm-specific human capital, his value 
inside the firm deviates from that at other firms. The 
longer the worker’s tenure, the more specific human cap-
ital is accumulated and the more costly it would be for 
the firm to find an external candidate that outperforms 
internal workers. For newly created establishments this 
argument is particularly relevant as the internally trans-
ferred employees may be responsible for expertise trans-
fer that can be crucial to the new unit’s survival.
Considering the extension of the internal labor mar-
kets’ theory to a multi-plant framework (Tavares et  al. 
2018) we will be interested in analyzing the existence of 
ports of entry. In the newly created establishment some 
jobs will be filled with workers working in other units 
of the same firm, whereas other jobs will be filled with 
individuals hired outside the firm. The latter are, in the 
ILM terminology, the ports of entry to the establishment, 
and again, according to the ILM literature, are those 
jobs within the establishment that require less firm-spe-
cific human capital. These are, presumably, lower-rank 
jobs. Higher-rank jobs, on the contrary, require more 
firm-specific human capital which can only be acquired 
by working in the firm. Hence, these jobs will be filled 
from within, i.e., through internal transfers of workers 
from pre-existing establishments to the new one. The 
strategic decisions that affect the new plants survival 
are more likely to be defined at higher hierarchical lev-
els. On this premise, Lima and Martins (2006) assess the 
impact of external recruitment of top managers on firm 
performance and several studies on managerial succes-
sion address the impact of internal versus external hir-
ing of CEO (Lauterbach et  al. 1999; Furtado and Karan 
1994) and of CEO turnover (Murphy 1999; Huson et al. 
2004) on the firm’s performance. Chan (1996) argues that 
internal employees hired to high positions are more likely 
to have been hired on the basis of their ability providing 
another argument why internal hiring at top levels is par-
ticularly relevant.
3  The data
The data set in this study was constructed using Quad-
ros de Pessoal (QP; Personnel Records), a rich matched 
employer-employee data set. QP is an annual mandatory 
employment survey collected by the Portuguese Ministry 
of Labor, Solidarity, and Social Security that all firms with 
wage earners are legally obliged to fill in. The coverage 
and reliability of the data set is one of its advantages. The 
data include establishment-specific details (employment, 
location, industry), information on the firm with which 
the establishment is affiliated (location, industry, number 
of establishments, employment, sales, ownership, legal 
framework), and workforce characteristics (gender, age, 
education, occupation, tenure, earnings, hours of work). 
The data set has a longitudinal dimension. Firms, estab-
lishments and workers entering the database are assigned 
a unique identifying number which allows to track them 
over time and to match workers with their firms and 
establishments.
We use the 2003 to 2008 waves of QP. The data corre-
sponding to years 2003 to 2005 are used to identify the 
creation of new establishments.2 We want to analyze 
short-term survival so, each new establishment is fol-
lowed for 3 years after its creation: units created in 2003 
are followed until 2006, the ones created in 2004 are 
tracked until 2007 and new establishments in 2005 are 
followed until 2008. We identify an establishment entry 
whenever information for that establishment is reported 
to QP for the first time in the corresponding spell, i.e., if 
the establishment is not present in any of the preceding 
waves of the data.3 Similarly, we will identify an estab-
lishment exit in one year whenever information for the 
establishment is absent for that year and for all subse-
quent years, i.e., if the establishment is not present in 
any of the subsequent waves of the data. We do not make 
use of the waves of data available since 2008 as we don’t 
wish to contaminate the analysis with the effects of the 
severe crisis that hit the Portuguese economy following 
the international recession.
In the data set, an establishment is defined as a single 
business location of a firm, new establishments being 
assigned different identification numbers. Given this 
definition, we will observe an opening if the firm creates 
a new establishment but also if an existing establishment 
is relocated or if a new plant is created after the merger 
and/or closure of previously existing units of the firm. 
As shown in Table 1, 1,57,953 new establishments were 
1 Several factors may explain the creation of internal labor markets. ILM may 
be a response to imperfect information about the optimal job assignment for 
each worker (Jovanovic 1979) or may result from the firm’s incentives struc-
ture (Lazear 1979). Moreover, risk-averse employers may prefer to hire from 
within, as internal employees’ ability can be observed with less noise (Green-
wald 1979).
2 We didn’t want to analyze a period of strong economic expansion or reces-
sion so 2003 to 2005 was selected because the Portuguese output gap was 
relatively low.
3 For each year, we use all previous spells of the data (since 1985) to identify 
an entry.
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created in the 3 years period between 2003 and 2005. 
These new establishments employ almost 700 thousand 
workers. In Table  2 we observe that newborn units are 
affiliated with firms that have, on average, 1.6 establish-
ments and 13 workers. We also observe that more than 
three fourths of the entries are affiliated with single-
establishment firms, that are predominant in the data.
For the purpose of this paper, we are interested in 
newly created establishments for which the correspond-
ing parent firm has the option to transfer workers from 
another establishments within the organization. For this 
possibility to be real, the new units in our sample have to 
be affiliated to a firm that pre-existed before the opening. 
Our sample is further restricted to newly created estab-
lishments that belong to firms that remain or become 
multi-establishment after the opening. Therefore, we 
keep new establishments that are affiliated with firms 
that are multi-establishment in both periods, before the 
opening and in the year of the opening, but also firms 
that grow from single to multi-establishment firm. The 
cases of single-single or multi-single were excluded as 
these are either firms that closed down an establishment 
and opened a replacement establishment (possibly due 
to relocation of the existing plant) or firms that closed 
all its pre-existing establishments merging them into a 
newly created unit. In both cases, the “new” establish-
ments are likely to be transformations of pre-existing 
establishments rather than truly new units. Under these 
circumstances, internally transferred workers will nec-
essarily come from establishments that were closed and 
these transfers are expected to be driven by different fac-
tors than those that we seek to investigate in this study. 
Moreover, we don’t include in the sample establishments 
created by firms that close during the follow-up period 
as, in this case, the closure of the establishment is a con-
sequence of the closure of the entire firm and the workers 
will necessarily lose their jobs not having the possibility 
of being transferred to another establishment of the same 
firm (the occurrence of establishment closures driven by 
entire firm exits was less than 1% of our sample).
Our final sample contains 24,163 newly created estab-
lishments that are affiliated to a pre-established par-
ent firm that is multi-establishment after opening the 
new branch and that remains open during the follow-up 
period.4 Our sample of new establishments represents 
15% of total openings in the period 2003–2005 and is 
responsible for 29% of the employment created by all 
new establishments. When compared to the total group 
of entrants, the new establishments in our sample have 
twice as many workers, even though, most of them, are 
still small, with 55% employing 3 workers or less.
Looking at the characteristics of the parent firms in 
our sample, as we restricted to multi-establishment firms 
after the opening, it is not surprising that the parent 
firms in our final sample are considerably larger having, 
on average, 7 establishments and almost 100 workers. On 
the other hand, as we kept only firms that pre-existed, 
the fact that the firms in our sample are older is also 
expected. Tables  3 and 4 characterize our final sample 
and Fig. 1 characterizes the firms in the sample according 
to the number of establishments owned. We observe that 
Table 1 Characterizing new establishments, 2003–2005
2003 2004 2005 2003–2005
Number of new establish-
ments
50942 46805 60206 157953
Number of workers 235343 203918 255731 694992
Estab. average number of 
workers
4.6 4.3 4.2 4.4
Table 2 Characterizing firms, 2003–2005
2003 2004 2005
Number of firms: 45,335 41,789 53,989
Single-establishment 39,627 36,395 48,370
Multi-establishment 5708 5394 5619
Firm average number of estab. 1.6 1.6 1.6
Firm average number of workers 13.6 13.2 12.1
Firm average age (in years) 4.9 5.0 6.9
Table 3 Sample characterization—new establishments, 
2003–2005
2003 2004 2005 2003–2005
Number of new establishments 8481 7749 7933 24,163
Number of workers 67,191 61,981 69,574 1,98,746
Estab. average number of work-
ers
8.3 8.4 8.7 8.5
Table 4 Sample characterization—firms, 2003–2005
2003 2004 2005
Number of firms 4523 4310 4339
Firm average number of estab. 6.5 6.6 7.0
Firm average number of workers 93.0 91.4 103.9
Firm average age (in years) 15.2 15.2 15.0
4 We observed that 32,803 are affiliated with firms that existed in the previous 
period but, out of these, 8411establishments were linked to firms that were 
single-establishment after the opening and were dropped from the sample.
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a large majority of multi-establishment firms have less 
than 10 establishments.
3.1  Identifying internal hires
Matching information on workers, establishments and 
their firms we are able to classify workers according to 
their origin. Internal hires in period t, worked for the 
same employer but in another establishment of the firm 
in the year t-1. For these workers, we observe a change in 
the establishment’s identification number but the firm’s 
identification number remains unchanged.5,6 Workers 
that meet this criterion may be in two different situations: 
1. The worker is transferred from an establishment that 
remains active (henceforth, Type I transfers);
2. The worker is transferred from an establishment that 
ceased its operations (henceforth, Type II transfers).
This distinction is important because the decision to 
transfer workers from establishments that close (Type 
II transfers) is driven by different factors than those 
determining Type I transfers, as they are an alternative to 
a dismissal rather than a transfer driven move.
Most remaining hiring situations are classified as exter-
nal hirings. External hires include workers that, in the 
previous wave of the data, were: 
1. Employed with a different firm (henceforth, External: 
Other firm);
2. Not present in the data set in the previous year, 
meaning that they were either out of the labor force 
(new labor market entrants or re-entrants), unem-
ployed, self-employed or employed as a civil servant 
(henceforth, External: Outside QP).
We found, however, one last case of hirings that we can-
not classify into any of the above types of hiring, inter-
nal or external. This is a category of workers that are 
employed at time t in a newly created establishment and 
undergo a change in the identification number of the firm 
they are working for but their reported tenure is longer 
than 12 months. This situation may be due either to 
workers hired externally that were able to secure what-
ever tenure they accumulated in their previous job (which 
may be important for certain types of employer-provided 
benefits), or to workers that are hired from other firms 
belonging to the same “economic group” as the destina-
tion firm. In the former case, but not in the latter these 
are, indeed, external hires. As we cannot separate one 
situation from the other, we classify these situations into 
a separate group (henceforth referred to as uncertain ori-
gin hires). The incidence of these cases although small is 
Fig. 1 Sample characterization: firms by number of establishments, 2003–2005
5 We also included in this category workers that, in the previous year, don’t 
appear in the dataset but show a tenure higher than 12 months. This indicates 
that they already worked for that same firm in the previous year but, for some 
reason, were not reported.
6 This classification is straightforward if the individual works only for one 
employer. When the individual, in year t-1, worked for more than one firm 
we classify him as an internal hire provided that the individual worked for 
the firm that is opening the new establishment even if he also worked for 
other firms.
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not trivial.7 In Fig. 2 we summarize the five origins that 
we consider in the empirical work.
3.2  Characterizing the data
In this section we further characterize the newly created 
establishments in our final sample as well as their per-
sonnel. Looking at the establishments’ distribution by 
economic activity and considering the Portuguese Clas-
sification of Economic Activity (cae),8 in our sample, cae 
G, wholesale and retail trade, stands out, accounting for 
40% of the new plants. Financial activities, real estate, 
renting and business activities (cae J and cae K) rank 
second accounting for more than 20% of the new units 
in our sample. Regarding the geographical distribution, 
we observe some regional concentration with 31% of the 
establishments located in the Lisbon area.
Table  5 characterizes the new plant’s personnel in 
terms of its origin in the internal or external labor mar-
kets. In our sample and for the all period 2003–2005, 
we observe that, on average, around 40% of the workers 
are hired in the external labor market: 15% of which are 
hired from another firm, while 25% are not present in the 
data set in the year before the opening. We also observe 
8% of uncertain origin hires.
Therefore, we find that more than half of the workforce 
in the new establishment is recruited inside the parent 
firm. This proportion may seem surprisingly high but is 
better understood if we look at the proportion of internal 
transfers from establishments that remain open (Inter-
nal: Type I). For Type I internal transfers, the proportion 
drops to 29%, leading us to conclude that several open-
ings may be linked to a closure or a relocation of one (or 
more) previously existing units. Nevertheless, depending 
on the year, we observe that between one fourth and one 
third of the workforce is internally hired from existing 
establishments that remain open, confirming the impor-
tance of intra-firm hires in opening events.
The proportion of internal and external hires var-
ies depending on the hierarchical level and occupation. 
In Table  6 we analyze the type of hiring by hierarchical 
level.9 We find that internal hiring is more important for 
top and intermediary executives as well as for supervisors 
while external hiring is predominant for lower skilled 
professionals. Our data also includes information about 
the workers’ occupation, distinguishing between nine 
major occupational categories according to the National 
Fig. 2 Types of recruitment
Table 5 Type of hiring per yea, 2003–2005
Type of hiring 2003 (%) 2004 (%) 2005 (%) 2003/2005 (%)
Internal (total) 54.0 55.3 46.1 51.8
Internal: Type I 28.8 33.1 25.7 29.2
Internal: Type II 25.2 22.2 20.4 22.6
External: outside QP 22.8 24.7 28.7 25.3
External: other firm 13.0 15.2 16.3 14.8
Uncertain origin 10.2 4.8 8.9 8.1
9 We distinguish eight hierarchical levels defined by law: Decreto-Lei no. 
121/78, 2 Junho (see Appendix A).
7 In Table 5 we observe that uncertain origin transfers represent 8% of total 
hires.
8 Equivalent to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (see 
Appendix B).
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Classification of Occupations (NCO).10 Overall, external 
labor market hires seem to prevail for occupations that 
require less skills and that are closer to the bottom of 
the hierarchy.11 We observe that internal hiring becomes 
more important as we move up the job ladder. The lower 
levels, in the typical establishment, are much more likely 
to be hired from the outside while the upper levels are 
much more likely to be hired from within. This is con-
sistent with the existence of ports of entry jobs into the 
establishment (Lazear and Oyer 2004) and highlights 
the role of firm-specific human capital as a determinant 
of internal transfers. Nonetheless, we also observe that a 
nontrivial proportion of vacancies at every level are filled 
by external hires, suggesting that firms’ hiring strategies 
are complex and don’t follow a strict policy of hiring from 
outside exclusively into a limited set of levels and from 
inside into others. For example, even at the two highest 
hierarchical levels 16% to 19% of the workers are exter-
nally hired, which suggests that there is some level of 
fluidity.
Internal hiring also varies with the firm and the estab-
lishment’s size. The proportion of internal hires from 
establishments that remain open (Type I) decreases 
with the new establishment’s size. Regarding firm size, 
we see that the proportion of internal hires seems to be 
higher for establishments that are affiliated with parent 
firms with less than 50 workers and with parent firms 
with more than 100 workers. Internal hiring also varies 
with the establishment’s sector of activity. Internal hiring 
(both type I and Type II transfers) prevails in cae B (fish-
ing), cae F (construction) and cae I (transport, storage 
and communication) and internal hiring from establish-
ments that remain active (Type I transfers) prevail in cae 
I (transport, storage and communication), in cae B (fish-
ing) and in cae E (electricity, gas and water supply).12
Observing the 1,99,058 workers in our sample, employ-
ees that work in the newly created establishments,13 we 
notice that internally hired workers are older than aver-
age while individuals that are hired in the external labor 
market, particularly those that were out of the data set 
in the previous year, are younger indicating that some of 
these individuals may be starting their way in the labor 
market. The majority of internal hires have more than 36 
months of tenure. Internal hires have a higher propor-
tion of males while external hires have a predominance 
of females. When compared to external hires we find 
that internally hired individuals have a slightly higher 
proportion of workers with tertiary education.14 We also 
observe a lower proportion of top and middle managers 
in the group of externally hired individuals and a higher 
proportion of top hierarchical levels in the group of inter-
nal workers. Non-skilled professionals and apprentices 
are predominant in the group of externally hired work-
ers. Frequently, these new establishments are smaller 
branches of the parent firm and so it is not surprising 
that, overall top executives only represent 5.3% of the 
workforce and over 70% of the hired workers are merely 
skilled or less than skilled professionals.15
3.3  Establishment’s survival statistics
We find that 22% of the newly created establishments 
have closed after one year, allowing us to conclude that 
we have a relatively high death rate in the first year after 
the opening. In the 2  years that follow, the closure rate 
drops. As we can see in the Kaplan–Meier survival plot 
Table 6 Type of hiring by hierarchical level: 2003–2005
Type of hiring Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8
Internal (total) (%) 74.2 61.1 71.3 59.2 53.1 50.3 48.1 31.9
Internal: Type I (%) 41.8 34.5 37.2 33.9 27.9 27.6 24.2 16.6
Internal: Type II (%) 32.4 26.6 34.1 25.3 25.2 22.7 23.9 15.3
External: outside QP (%) 9.1 7.1 10.0 10.1 21.3 28.8 29.5 46.8
External: other firm (%) 9.4 9.2 11.5 8.7 14.6 16.0 15.2 17.2
Uncertain origin (%) 7.3 22.6 7.2 22.0 11.0 4.9 7.2 4.1
Number of estab. (%) 4238 4292 4467 4975 15519 6170 4710 3641
10 Equivalent to the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO): see Appendix C.
11 For further details you may check the table in Appendix C.
12 For more detailed data see Appendix E.
13 We performed consistency checks on the panel. If we found an incon-
sistency in the variables gender, age, or tenure this was repaired, if possible; 
otherwise, the worker was removed from the sample (deleted observations 
represent less than 1%).
14 In this item, uncertain origin hires stand out because of the considerably 
higher proportion of more educated workers when compared with the other 
groups of individuals. We observe that more than half of these workers have 
12 or more years of schooling. This might be consistent with a stronger bar-
gain power of these workers allowing them to secure tenure.
15 For more detailed data see Appendix F.
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depicted in Fig.  3, 3  years after the opening 44% of the 
new establishments have closed (from the 24,163 new 
establishments, 13,397 remain open).
4  Empirical methodology: duration models, 
unobserved heterogeneity and shared frailty 
models
In order to analyze the new plant’s survival we define a 
duration variable that measures the time elapsed since 
opening. The new establishments in our sample are fol-
lowed until closure or for 3  years after the opening, 
hence, right censoring exists and is accommodated. We 
estimate duration models with time-invariant covariates 
as we are interested in analyzing how the plant’s initial 
recruitment strategies affect the new unit’s short term 
survival.
We acknowledge that the decision to transfer work-
ers to the new establishment raises selectivity issues 
that, if ignored, lead to biased estimates. For inter-
nal hires, selection may occur for two reasons. First, 
employers choose which employee is offered the 
opportunity to move to the new establishment. Then, 
the transfer will only be observed if the worker accepts 
the opportunity he/she is offered. Both decisions are 
determined by the expected gains arising from the 
expected increase in the value of the match, i.e., inter-
nal transfers are the result of administrative selection 
and self-selection. This selectivity issues might them-
selves affect the establishment’s survival. We estimate 
duration models with both firm-specific and establish-
ment-specific controls. The former include the parent 
firm’s growth, employment, number of plants and age 
and are included to control for the effect of observed 
characteristics that are shared by the newly created 
establishments affiliated with the same parent firm. 
The latter are the establishment’s size and workforce 
structure (age, education, gender, hierarchical level 
and proportion of workers that are shared by the new 
establishment and other establishments of the same 
parent firm). The spatial dimension is also relevant in 
this context, as monitoring costs, information asym-
metries and the share of internal transfer may depend 
on the distance to headquarters and other branches 
(Kalnins and Lafontaine 2013; Charnoz et  al. 2018). 
To account for this spatial dimension, we also control 
for the distance from the new unit to the headquarters 
and the presence of other branches in the region where 
the new establishment is created. Notwithstanding the 
covariates included, there may still exist various fac-
tors that are unobservable to the researcher and that 
might affect the new unit’s survival.
To account for selection on the unobservables, 
we estimate a frailty model, introducing a random 
parameter into the hazard rate that accounts for the 
Fig. 3 Kaplan–Meier survival estimate
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unobserved heterogeneity (Chamberlain 1985).16 Not 
taking into account unobserved heterogeneity in dura-
tion models is particularly serious as it exacerbates 
negative duration dependence. This happens because, 
over time, as the frail units fail, the sample becomes 
populated by more and more robust individuals. As a 
consequence, the population hazards decline over time 
regardless of the shape of hazards that individuals face 
(Lancaster 1990).
Frailty models can account for frailties that are indi-
vidual specific or frailties that are group-specific. To test 
the inclusion of establishment-specific frailty, we esti-
mated a duration model with individual frailty including 
the above mentioned covariates and tested the hypoth-
eses that θ (the variance of the frailty term present in 
the hazard model) is equal to zero. The likelihood ratio 
test didn’t reject the hypotheses of θ being equal to zero, 
reducing the model to the standard survival function. 
Group unobserved heterogeneity arrises because the 
observations within a subgroup share unmeasured risk 
factors that may prompt them to exit earlier than other 
subgroups. This kind of frailty may exist for new estab-
lishments affiliated with the same parent firm as they 
share a common family background that might affect 
their survival. Likewise, it’s reasonable to believe that 
units affiliated with different firms face different risks of 
closure.
We observe that several plants in our sample are affili-
ated with the same parent firm, as one firm may open 
several new units within the observed period (2003–
2005). In Table  7 we see that 7479 firms open only one 
establishment but 3419 firms open more then one new 
unit.
Some of the characteristics that prompt a new estab-
lishments affiliated with one parent firm to be more (or 
less) prone to failure are directly accounted for in our 
duration model while others may be unobservable or 
unmeasurable. The shared frailty models assume that 
similar observations share a frailty that causes obser-
vations within the same group to be correlated, even 
though frailty may vary from group to group. To check 
for the appropriateness of introducing shared frailty in 
our model, we analyze the results from the likelihood 
ratio test of H0 : θ = 0 . The result of the test indicates a 
statistically significant level of unobserved heterogeneity 
since the obtained p-value is virtually zero. We follow by 
briefly presenting the shared frailty models and how they 
relate to the individual frailty models.
The hazard function approximates the probability of 
closing within a short interval, conditional on having sur-
vived up to the starting time of the interval, that is:
where f(t) is the probability density function, F(t) is the 
distribution function and S(t) is the survival function.
If we integrate the hazard function we obtain:
which relates to the survival function simply by:
An particularly important class of models with time-
invariant regressors is the proportional hazard model 
that can be written as:
Now, suppose we have a sample of j observations where 
some units are more prone than others to fail due to 
unobserved heterogeneity. If we have unobserved frail-
ties, the hazard rate will be a function not only of the 
covariates but also of the frailties:
where Wj is a frailty term drawn from a probability distri-
bution with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. If ψ = 0, the 
standard proportional hazard model is obtained.17 We 
can rewrite the hazard in the following form:
h(t) = lim
�t→0
P(t ≤ T < t +�t|T ≥ t)
�t
=
f (t)
1− F(t)
=
f (t)
S(t)
�(t) =
t∫
0
h(u)du
S(t) = exp

−
t�
0
h(u)

 = exp (−�(t)).
hj(t) = h0(t)e
Xjβ
hj(t) = h0(t)e
(Xjβ+Wjψ)
hj(t) = h0(t)υje
Xjβ where υj = e
Wjψ .
Table 7 Parent firm characterization by  number of   
establishments created, 2003–2005
Number of new estab. opened Number of firms
1 7479
2 to 9 3174
10 to 19 143
20 to 49 78
More than 50 24
16 Frailty models account for unobserved heterogeneity given the assumptions 
imposed by the model. For a discussion about the assumptions and limitation 
of these models please see Xue and Brookmeyer (1996), Clayton and Cuzick 
(1985), Hougaard (1986), Elbers and Ridder (1982).
17 Also, if we could measure/observe and directly include Wj in our model, 
then ψ would again go to 0.
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The hazard rate is now conditional on both the covari-
ates, X, and the frailty term, υ . For identification pur-
poses, we assume that the mean of υ is 1 and that the 
variance is unknown and equal to the parameter θ.
If the hazard is a function of the frailties, then the sur-
vival function is also conditional on both the covariates 
and the frailty term. Thus, we have the conditional sur-
vival function (Lancaster 1990) as:
To derive the expected value of the survival function, we 
need to specify g(v),   a probability distribution for υ.18 
With the adoption of a distribution g(v), the expected sur-
vival function is derived from the hazard rate:
where L is the Laplace transformation. This function is 
commonly referred to as the marginal survival function. 
Once the frailty is integrated out, accounting for unob-
served heterogeneity is reduced to estimating θ , the vari-
ance of the frailty term.
For empirical purposes, we will consider a Weibull 
frailty model, so the conditional survival function is:
Additionally, we will assume a gamma distribution for 
g(υ) . With gamma frailty, the marginal Weibull survival 
function is:
and the hazard rate is now:19
The main difference between shared and unshared frailty 
models is the assumption about how the frailty is distrib-
uted in the data as the frailty is now group-specific. Sup-
pose we have j observations (new establishments) and i 
subgroups (parent firms). The hazard rate for the jth indi-
vidual in the ith subgroup is:
S(t,X , υ) = exp

−
t�
0
h(u|υ)du

 = exp

−υ
t�
0
h(u)du


S(t) = E[S(t,X , υ)] = E

exp

−υ
t�
0
h(u)du




= L

exp


t�
0
h(u)du




S(t|υ) = e−(υt)
ρ
S(t) = [1+ θ(t)ρ]
− 1
θ
h(t) = ρρtρ−1[S(t)]θ
where Wi is the subgroup frailty that the j units share. 
The frailty is assumed to be independently distributed 
with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1.20 The hazard can be 
rewritten as:
The only difference from the individual frailty models is 
that frailty is now shared among the j establishments of 
the ith parent firm. To estimate the shared frailty model 
we just need to proceed exactly as in the case of individ-
ual heterogeneity, making the assumptions about g(ν).
Accounting for firm-specific frailty, in the follow-
ing section, we discuss the results for the shared frailty 
model.
4.1  Estimation and results
Estimation results are summarized in Table 8. All the esti-
mated regressions report the hazard ratios, include a set 
of time, industry and region dummies and controls for 
workers’ hierarchical levels. A detailed description of the 
included covariates can be found in Appendix D. In the 
first estimation we report a standard Weibull duration 
model that controls only for observed (individual and 
shared) heterogeneity. In the second model we report 
results for a shared frailty model that also controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity shared between new units 
that are affiliated with the same parent firm, consider-
ing a gamma distribution for the shared frailty.21 In the 
third specification, we also report a shared frailty model 
but we add a control for the proportion of internal trans-
fers at the plant’s top hierarchical level. We stress that we 
include a control for the proportion of internal hires at 
the plant’s highest hierarchical level and not the propor-
tion of hires for “top executives”, the highest hierarchical 
level in the data. This choice stems from the observation 
that most of these new units are small branches of the 
parent firm, that often don’t have top managers in their 
personnel. However, even in small units, the transfer of 
firm-specific knowledge plays an important role and it’s 
likely that this task is mainly carried out by workers with 
leadership roles that occupy the plant’s highest hierar-
chical level. Therefore, to capture the importance of top 
level workers in knowledge transfer but also to account 
for the establishments’ personnel structure, we identified 
hij(t) = h0(t)e
Xijβ+Wiψ
hij(t) = h0(t)υie
Xijβ where υi = e
Wiψ .
21 As a robustness check we also estimated the model considering an 
inverse-Gaussian distribution for the shared frailty and obtained similar 
results.
18 The gamma distribution is the most commonly used in the literature.
19 When the variance of the frailty θ is 0, the model reduces to the standard 
Weibull model.
20 Again, if ψ = 0 or if we could directly observe and include Wi , the standard 
proportional hazards model is obtained.
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the highest hierarchical level present in each new estab-
lishment and included a control for the proportion of 
internal hires in this highest level.
Analyzing the first specification, that disregards unob-
served heterogeneity, we see that the Weibull hazard 
function exhibits a positive duration dependence as the 
estimated ρ parameter is greater than 1, meaning that the 
new plant’s hazard of failure increases over time. How-
ever, as discussed in the previous section, if unobserved 
frailty exists this estimate is likely to be biased down-
wards as the frailty pushes down the duration depend-
ence. Indeed, in the shared frailty model, reported in the 
second column, we can observe an increase in the param-
eter ρ.
With frailty models, we can distinguish between the 
hazard rates that individuals face and the population 
hazard. In a standard proportional hazard model, these 
hazards are the same since all individuals are assumed 
to be identical. However, in a heterogeneous population, 
with group-shared frailty the population hazard can fall 
while the individual hazards rise because, over time, as 
the frail members close, the population becomes crowded 
by more and more robust individuals. This frailty effect 
assures that population hazards may decline over time 
regardless of the shape of hazards that individuals face. 
Considering the gamma shared frailty model reported in 
the second column of Table 8, we show in Fig. 4 the pop-
ulation (or unconditional) hazard, while the mean indi-
vidual (or conditional) hazard is shown in Fig. 5. Indeed, 
we observe that the population hazard does decline after 
the second year whereas the individual hazard continues 
to climb.
Examining the results for the shared frailty models, 
we also observe that new plants affiliated with growing 
Table 8 Duration model and shared frailty model: 2003–2008
Specifications include time, industry and region dummies and controls for worker’s
hierarchical level
***, **, * denotes statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively
Variables Duration model Shared frailty I Shared frailty II
Haz. ratio t-ratio Haz. ratio t-ratio Haz. ratio t-ratio
% Internal (Type I) 0.7783*** (− 8.15) 0.7952*** (− 5.41) 0.9664 (− 0.42)
% Internal (Type II) 1.0250 (0.80) 0.8431*** (− 4.04) 0.8379*** (− 4.18)
% Uncertain Origin 0.6484*** (− 7.33) 0.9275 (− 0.86) 0.9211 (− 0.94)
% Internal (I): Top level 0.8239*** (− 2.76)
Plant size 0.8244*** (− 17.27) 0.7661*** (− 18.06) 0.7685*** (− 17.79)
Distance 0.9998 (− 0.62) 0.9999 (− 0.38) 0.9999 (− 0.37)
Est. Concent. 0.7929*** (− 5.53) 0.8486** (− 2.46) 0.8504** (− 2.43)
Plant: % 25 to 34 1.1059* (2.44 ) 1.0915* (1.66) 1.0897 (1.63)
Plant: % 34 to 54 1.0952** (2.25) 1.1004* (1.74) 1.0987* (1.72)
Plant: % + 54 1.0360 (0.56) 1.1521* (1.65) 1.1477 (1.61)
Plant: % Educ 9 0.9527 (− 1.46) 0.9961 (− 0.08) 0.9981 (− 0.05)
Plant: % Educ 12 0.8639*** (− 4.25) 0.9263 (− 1.55) 0.9275 (− 1.53)
Plant: % Educ + 12 0.8680** (− 2.58) 1.0440 (− 0.56) 1.0415 (− 0.53)
Plant % Female 0.8960*** (− 4.18) 0.9387 (− 1.60) 0.9383 (− 1.61)
Plant % Shared 1.6377*** (3.03) 1.8461** (2.44) 1.8527** (2.46)
Firm growth 0.8426*** (− 7.18) 0.9262* (− 2.17) 0.9260** (− 2.18)
Firm size 0.9227*** (− 9.59) 0.9111*** (− 5.09) 0.9115*** (− 5.06)
Multi-plant firm 1.0431** (1.74) 0.9578 (− 1.05) 0.9589 (− 1.02)
Firm age 0.9999 (− 0.52) 1.0002 (0.87) 1.0001 (0.88)
Constant 0.1067*** (− 18.72) 0.1134*** (− 11.53) 0.1136*** (− 11.52)
N 24,163 24,163 24,163
ρ 1.3232 1.8215 1.8216
θ 1.9591 1.9571
Log likelihood − 24677.94 − 22464.68 − 22460.85
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Fig. 4 Population/unconditional hazard
Fig. 5 Individual/conditional hazard
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firms are less likely to close.22 New establishments affili-
ated with large firms also tend to be less prone to failure. 
Therefore, we may conclude that being linked to a large 
growing parent firm apparently increases the robustness 
of the new unit and provides a favorable environment for 
the new establishment. The parent firms’ age and being a 
multi-establishment firm before the opening of the new 
unit don’t appear to have a statistically significant impact 
on the new unit’s closure probability. Analyzing how new 
plants’ characteristics affect failure, we conclude that 
larger establishments have a decrease in the risk of clo-
sure of 23%. Previous studies on firm duration have con-
cluded that the probability of failure is negatively related 
to firm size (Mata and Portugal 1994). Larger units should 
be able to survive longer because, when facing negative 
outcomes, they have the option to shrink before they exit. 
On the other hand, larger entry size may signal greater 
a priori expectations of success and more periods with 
bad results will be needed to eliminate the ex ante posi-
tive expectations (Frank 1988). Larger units may also take 
longer to fail as small units tend to be more flexible and 
respond more easily to market fluctuations (Mills and 
Schumann 1985). Looking at the composition of the new 
plant’s personnel, we observe that plants with a higher 
proportion of young workers tend to fail less. Further-
more, new establishments with a higher proportion of 
more educated workers and with a higher proportion of 
skilled workers (i.e., workers in managerial and technical 
occupations) seem to have a lower probability of failing, 
although some of the regressors are not statistically sig-
nificant.23 We also conclude that the presence of a higher 
proportion of employees that the new plant has to share 
with other establishments of the parent firm increases the 
new unit’s risk of failure, as less time is dedicated by these 
workers to the new unit. The distance to the headquar-
ters doesn’t have a statistically significant impact in the 
new units survival. The existence of other branches in the 
same region where the establishment is created, reduces 
the risk of closure by around 15%, for both shared frailty 
specifications.
In order to discuss the relevance of firm-specific human 
capital, we assess how the firm’s recruitment strategy in 
the internal versus external labor market affects survival. 
Considering the shared frailty model in the second col-
umn of Table 8, we observe that a higher proportion of 
total internal hires, compared to external hires, decreases 
the probability of failing. This positive impact on the new 
establishment’s survival is obtained for both types of 
internal hires, whether they come from establishments 
that remain in operation (Type I transfers) whether 
they come from establishments that are closing (Type II 
transfer). For establishments with Type I transfers there 
is a reduction in the risk of closure of 20% and for Type 
II transfers this reduction is around 16%. This evidence 
supports our hypothesis that embodied firm-specific 
human capital plays an important role in improving the 
survival of newly created establishments.
However, not all employees are equally important in 
the process of knowledge transfer. To get a more detailed 
outlook on how this channel works, in the specification 
reported in column three of Table 8, we add a control for 
the proportion of internal hires at the new establishment’s 
top hierarchical level. Adding this control, we observe that 
the proportion of internal transfers at the highest hierar-
chical level reduces the risk of closure by 18% but, we also 
note that the total proportion of Type I internal hires loses 
its statistical significance. We may conclude that the inter-
nal hire of skilled workers at high-rank jobs is crucial to 
the new plant’s survival, corroborating the hypothesis that 
the transmission of firm-specific human capital is mainly 
carried out by these workers while lower skilled, undiffer-
entiated workers will not play such an important role in 
the knowledge transfer process. In the new plant, skilled 
workers will be responsible for the diffusion of firm-
specific human capital that will positively affect the new 
establishment’s survival. We conclude that, although some 
knowledge is tacit and hard to codify it can be successfully 
transferred from the parent firm to the new unit embod-
ied in the group of employees that are internally trans-
ferred. Internal transfers are likely to be one of the most 
important channels to share and transfer this “unique” 
asset to the new plant. Moreover, the positive impact on 
the firm’s survival generated by the proportion of internal 
hires at higher skilled positions corroborates the finding 
that workers internally hired to higher-rank jobs are more 
likely to have been chosen on the basis of their ability, as 
Chan (1996) pointed out.
5  Conclusion
In this paper we examined the survival of new plants 
affiliated with pre-established firms. Entrants from pre-
established firms deserve special and separated attention 
as the determinants of survival may differ. A central issue 
in entries by pre-established firms is that the parent firm 
can supply expertise in management and operational 
knowledge which may aid the new plant developing a 
successful entry strategy. Our work builds upon the study 
of the channels by which the parent firm or other estab-
lishments in the same group transfer expertise to the 
newly opened branch by suggesting a direct channel for 
22 To avoid endogeneity problems related to the impact on the firm’s growth 
due to the opening of the new unit, our growth dummy controls for the 
increase in the total number of workers employed by the firm not including 
the new unit’s employees.
23 Previous works have concluded that the larger the initial stock of human 
capital in the firm, the lower the likelihood that the firm will exit (Geroski 
et al. 2010).
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knowledge transfer that has been little addressed in pre-
vious literature: the internal transfer of employees from 
pre-existing units to the new establishment. Our hypoth-
esis is that within-firm and across establishments mobil-
ity plays a central role in the transfer of firm-specific 
knowledge and, therefore, positively affects survival.
We observed that internal hires are an important way 
to fill the new vacancies created by the opening of a new 
establishment. On average, more than half of the work-
ers in the new plant are hired from other establishments 
of the same firm. Although some of these employees 
were transferred from establishments that closed, we 
also found that the proportion of internal hires that were 
transferred from establishments that remain in operation 
was still high, reaching 30%, and this proportion increases 
to around 40% for the highest hierarchical levels and 
skilled workers. Among the reasons that can explain the 
option for internal hires, we believe that, for new entrants, 
the need to transfer firm-specific human capital to the 
new unit is a key argument. Indeed, we observed that 
almost 70% of the internally hired workers had more than 
36 months of tenure at the firm. The specific knowledge 
argument is also particularly pertinent for skilled work-
ers and we observed that internal hires prevail at higher 
levels and for skilled professionals. Overall, external labor 
market hires seemed to prevail for occupations that were 
closer to the bottom of the hierarchy, giving some support 
for the existence of ports of entry. Nevertheless, we also 
observed that firm’s recruitment strategies are complex 
and external hires may be observed virtually at all levels 
and, even for the two highest hierarchical levels, 16% to 
19% of the jobs were filled externally.
Duration models were used to analyze the impact of 
internal hiring on survival. Given that, new plants affili-
ated with the same parent firm share the same family 
background, we included shared frailty in our analysis to 
account for different risks of closure of establishments 
affiliated with different firms. The obtained results 
strongly supported the presence of shared unobserved 
heterogeneity that affects the new plant’s survival.
We observed that the proportion of internal hires has 
a positive impact on survival. The obtained results led 
us to conclude that internal transfers are, probably, one 
important channel to transfer firm-specific knowledge 
to the new establishments. This non-tradable unique 
asset may create an important competitive advan-
tage for new units affiliated with pre-established firms. 
We also concluded that not all types of employees are 
equally important to this process of knowledge trans-
fer. Low skilled workers are not at the centre of strategic 
decisions and, therefore, are not critical for a successful 
expertise transfer. The transfer of firm-specific expertise 
is carried out by the skilled workers that are internally 
hired to the new establishment’s top-level jobs. Finally, 
the improved survival of establishments with a higher 
proportion of skilled internal hires also supports the 
premise that at higher levels, hires are based on the can-
didates’ superior ability. Our main conclusion is that 
firm-specific knowledge, that is an important source of 
competitive advantage and that can improve the new 
plant’s survival, can be successfully transferred from the 
parent firm to the new unit embodied in the group of 
employees that are internally transferred.
Finally, bearing in mind our finding that a significant 
proportion of vacancies in the new plant are filled by 
employees transferred from other establishments of 
the same firm that remain open, we believe that prom-
ising future research in this field could focus on what 
happens at the origin when these workers are trans-
ferred to the new plant. Namely, it would be relevant 
to assess how the establishment of origin copes with 
the exit when an employee is transferred to a new 
establishment.
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Appendix A
Hierarchical levels defined by law (Decreto-Lei no. 121/78, 
de 2 Junho):
Level Description
Level 1 Top executives (top management)
Level 2 Intermediary executives (middle 
management)
Level 3 Supervisors, team leaders, foremen
Level 4 Higher-skilled professionals
Level 5 Skilled professionals
Level 6 Semi-skilled professionals
Level 7 Non-skilled professionals
Level 8 Apprentices, interns, trainees
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Appendix B
CAE—Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities 
(cae), equivalent to SIC codes:
cae Description
cae A Agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting and forestry
cae B Fishing
cae C Mining and quarrying
cae D Manufacturing
cae E Electricity, gas and water supply
cae F Construction
cae G Wholesale and retail trade
cae H Hotels and restaurants
cae I Transport, storage and communication
cae J Financial activities
cae K Real estate, renting and business activities
cae L Public Administration, Community, Social and Personal  Servicesa
cae M Education
cae N Health and social work
cae O Other community, social and personal service activities
cae P Families with household employee
cae Q International Institutions and other extra-territorial organizations
a
 Establishments belonging to CAE L were dropped as this sector 
is out of the main scope of our analysis (this establishments 
represented less than 1% of the initial group)
Appendix C
National classification of occupations (NCO), equivalent 
to the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO):
NCO Description
NCO 1 Executive civil servants, industrial directors and executives
NCO 2 Professionals and scientists
NCO 3 Middle management and technicians
NCO 4 Administrative and related workers
NCO 5 Service and sales workers
NCO 6 Farmers and skilled agricultural and fisheries workers
NCO 7 Skilled workers, craftsmen and similar
NCO 8 Machine operators and assembly workers
NCO 9 Unskilled workers
Type of hiring by NCO: 2003–2005
Type of hiring NCO1 NCO2 NCO3 NCO4 NCO5 NCO6 NCO7 NCO8 NCO9
Internal (total) (%) 76.8 68.3 55.3 55.6 43.2 53.3 64.3 64.8 51.2
Internal: Type I (%) 42.9 36.5 29.3 31.2 23.4 25.0 30.3 31.1 25.7
Internal: Type II (%) 33.9 31.8 26.0 24.4 19.8 28.3 34.0 33.7 25.5
External: outside 
QP (%)
7.2 15.4 13.0 18.5 34.3 22.0 17.5 15.9 27.7
External: other firm 
(%)
8.2 11.5 11.9 11.9 18.0 16.9 12.5 12.6 15.2
Uncertain origin 
(%)
7.8 4.8 19.8 14.0 4.5 7.8 5.7 6.7 5.9
Number of estab. 3500 2227 6574 9578 9654 355 3684 2216 4717
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Appendix D
Variables description:
Variable Description
% Internal (Type I) Percentage of workers transferred 
from an establishment that 
remains active (% of total)
% Internal (Type II) Percentage of workers transferred 
from an establishment that closed 
(% of total)
% Uncertain Origin Percentage of workers transferred 
from an establishment that closed 
(% of total)
% Internal (I): Top level Percentage of workers transferred 
from an establishment that 
remains active (% tot. at level)
Plant size New establishment size (log num-
ber of workers)
Plant: % 25 to 34 Percentage of workers in the new 
establishment between 25 and 34 
years (% of total)
Estab. concent Concentration of establishments of 
the same parent firm in the region 
(number of estab. in the region 
divided by the total number of 
estab.)
Distance Distance (in km) from the capital of 
the distrito where the estab. is cre-
ated to the capital of the distrito of 
the headquarters
Plant: % 34 to 54 Percentage of workers in the new 
establishment between 34 and 54 
years (% of total)
Plant: % +54 Percentage of workers in the new 
establishment with more than 54 
years (% of total)
Plant: % Educ 9 Percentage of workers in the new 
establishment with 6 or 9 years of 
schooling completed
Plant: % Educ 12 Percentage of workers in the new 
establishment with 12 years of 
schooling completed
Plant: % Educ + 12 Percentage of workers in the new 
establishment with more than 12 
years of schooling completed
Variables description (continuation):
Variable Description
Plant % female Percentage of female workers in the new establishment
Plant % shared Percentage of workers in the new establishment shared 
with other establishments
Firm growth Dummy equal 1 if the number of workers in the firm 
increase
Firm size Firm size (log number of workers)
Variable Description
Multi-plant firm Dummy equal 1 if the firm was multi-establishment 
before the new opening
Firm age Age of the firm in years
Appendix E
Characterizing new establishments: 2003–2005
CAE (%)
 A—Agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting and forestry 1.4
 B—Fishing 0.04
 C—Mining and quarrying 0.3
 D—Manufacturing 6.5
 E—Electricity, gas and water supply 0.5
 F—Construction 7.4
 G—Wholesale and retail trade 40.0
 H—Hotels and restaurants 7.5
 I—Transport, storage and communication 6.0
 J—Financial activities 10.1
 K—Real estate, renting and business activities 11.1
 L—Public adm., community, social and personal serv. –
 M—Education 0.9
 N—Health and social work 4.1
 O—Other community, social and personal service act. 4.2
 P—Families with household employee –
 Q—International inst. and other extra-territorial org. –
Region (%)
 Norte 27.0
 Centro 21.3
 Lisboa 30.7
 Alentejo 8.2
 Algarve 6.0
 Madeira 3.2
 Açores 3.4
 Foreign 0.2
Type of hiring by size of the new establishment: 2003–2005
Estab. Size No Estab Internal 
hiring 
(%)
Internal: 
Type I (%)
< 10 workers 20,395 51.3 29.6
10 ≤ workers < 50 3456 53.3 27.2
≥ 50 workers 541 59.3 27.1
24,392
Page 17 of 19Tavares  J Labour Market Res            (2020) 54:2 
Type of hiring by parent firm size: 2003–2005
Firm Size No Estab Internal 
hiring 
(%)
Internal: 
Type I (%)
<10 workers 6494 54.9 32.9
10 ≤ workers < 50 6932 51.2 28.2
50 ≤ workers < 100 2303 48.7 23.0
≥ 100 workers 8663 50.8 28.8
24,392
Type of hiring by economic activity: 2003–2005
CAE N o Estab Internal hiring (%) Internal: 
Type I 
(%)
A 333 57.1 27.6
B 10 79.2 48.3
C 69 66.1 39.2
D 1577 61.1 35.8
E 128 58.9 40.4
F 1814 73.9 29.5
CAE N o Estab Internal hiring (%) Internal: 
Type I 
(%)
G 9756 46.0 25.7
H 1830 40.8 23.8
I 1469 73.4 59.3
J 2473 45.7 25.7
K 2696 45.6 25.0
L 0 – –
M 213 60.1 33.5
N 1001 63.3 36.3
O 1023 56.5 27.0
P/Q 0 – –
24,392
Appendix F
Workers’ characteristics by type of hire: 2003–2005
All Internal External Uncertain
Total Type I Type II Out QP Other firm origin
Number of workers 1,99,058 1,11,506 5,2275 59,231 42552 25,512 19,488
Age (%)
 Less than 25 years 16.2 9.3 8.1 10.4 36.4 20.5 5.6
 [25, 34] 33.8 32.6 32.9 32.2 34.8 40.2 30.8
 [34, 54] 43.8 50.2 51.2 49.3 26.4 36.1 55.4
 More than 54 years 6.2 8.0 7.8 8.1 2.5 3.2 8.2
Female 46.3 41.4 42.0 40.9 55.8 50.5 48.4
Tenure (%)
 Less than 12 months 35.1 2.6 2.8 2.4 98.2 98.8 –
 [12, 36] 19.6 31.0 29.3 32.5 1.8 1.2 16.9
 More than 36 months 45.3 66.4 67.9 65.1 – – 83.1
Education (%)
 Less than 9 years 37.1 40.6 37.5 43.4 32.2 36.3 28.8
 9 years of schooling 23.7 21.8 22.9 20.9 28.3 27.2 19.6
 12 years of schooling 26.9 25.1 26.5 23.8 29.7 26.3 31.7
 More than 12 years 11.5 11.9 12.8 11.1 8.4 8.8 19.8
Hierarchical level (%)
 Top executives 5.3 6.9 7.9 6.1 1.8 3.4 5.9
 Intermed. executives 4.3 5.3 6 4.7 1.4 2.7 7.3
 Supervisors 4.6 6.2 5.9 6.4 2 3.7 3.0
 High-skilled prof. 8.0 9.1 10.9 7.4 2.9 4.3 17.9
 Skilled prof. 35.6 37.2 34.4 39.7 29.1 34.9 41.6
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All Internal External Uncertain
Total Type I Type II Out QP Other firm origin
 Semi-skilled prof. 15.1 15.9 19.9 12.2 16.2 15.4 7.9
 Non-skilled prof. 15.9 13.2 9.0 16.9 22.9 18.4 12.4
 Apprentices 4.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 11.5 7.0 2.3
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